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Rödl on the Self-Conscious Power of
Sensory Knowledge
David Lüthi
• Rödl propounds the thesis that I get to know that I perceive p in a different way from
how I get to know that p. Thus he hopes to block the regress that threatens when I
answer the question ‘Why do you think that p?’ with ‘Because I perceive that p’.
• The idea is that I know that I perceive p ‘on the same basis’ as I know that p, where by
‘basis’ is not meant the means, perception, but the perception that p. I. e. I know that I
perceive p not by perceiving that I perceive p, but by perceiving that p!
• How does it work? It works, says Rödl, thanks to the self-consciousness of the ‘causality’
between acts of knowing something through perceiving it and the power underlying such
acts. Now here, I’m afraid, my power of understanding starts to flounder, but let me
try.
• On Rödl’s notion of causality, A causes B iff A can figure in an explanation as a sufficient
ground for the existence of B. Such a causality between A and B is self-conscious iff it
obtains only because it is represented as such by a subject.
• Rödl gives two examples, in both of which A and B are acts: (First example) My wanting
to fetch the camera (act A) causes me to go upstairs (act B) only because I represent
the ‘causality’ between the two acts, i. e. because I represent my wanting to fetch the
camera as a sufficient ground for my going upstairs. (Second example) My thinking p
(act A) causes me to think q (act B) only because I represent the ‘causality’ between the
two acts, i. e. because I represent my thinking p as a sufficient ground for my thinking
q.
• This pattern is then applied by Rödl to the case where (B) is an act of knowing some-
thing through perceiving it, and (A) is not an act, but a power: the human power of
knowing things through perceiving them.
• Thus, presumably, the power of sensory knowledge (power A) is supposed to cause me
to know p through perceiving it (act B), because I represent the ‘causality’ between the
power of sensory knowledge and my act of knowing p through perceiving it; i. e. because
I represent the power of sensory knowledge as a sufficient ground for my knowing p
through perceiving it.
• This, I guess, does show how in any act of knowing something through perceiving it, an
act of knowing that one knows it through perception is involved insofar as in the course
of the act (so to speak), one represents the power of sensory knowledge as the ‘cause’ of
one’s knowing p through perceiving it.
• So I suggest we put to the side for a minute any qualms we might have as to why
we should be representing any such thing as a power of sensory knowledge in acts of
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perceiving, and buy all of this as a disjunctive account of experience. Even so, I’m afraid,
I perceive – or at least think I perceive – two fundamental lacunae:
1. First, I can’t help suspecting that there is something fishy about the notion of
self-conscious causality as Rödl introduces it. Rödl appears to think that where
we have a self-conscious causality between A and B, it is the ‘causality’ itself, i. e.
A’s being a sufficient ground for the existence of B, that is represented and thus
constitutes the ‘causality’. But as Rödl himself points out, in the two example
cases he adduces there are rational, inferential relations underwriting the ‘causal’
ones – a means-ends relation between acts in the one case, an unspecified type
of inference relation between thought contents in the other. And it seems to me
that it is them that are (tacitly or explicitly) represented by the subject and thus
constitute the ‘causality’: it is my representation of going upstairs as a means to the
end of fetching the camera that makes my wanting to fetch the camera a sufficient
ground for my going upstairs; and it is my representation of q as some sort of
consequence of p that makes my thinking p a sufficient ground for my thinking q.
Now, what is the relation that underwrites the ‘causality’ in the case of knowing
something through perceiving it ‘because’ of the power of sensory knowledge? In
other words, what makes the power of sensory knowledge a sufficient ground for
one’s knowing p through perceiving it? Rödl doesn’t say anything about this, and
as long as he doesn’t, his theory remains incomprehensible.
2. Second, contrary to what the theory purports, it does not show that perceiving that
p is the basis on which one knows that one perceives that p. It does explain how
any act of perceiving that p involves another, sort of component act of representing
the power of sensory knowledge, and thus of knowing that one perceives that p.
But as this way of putting things makes clear, the perceiver doesn’t know that she
perceives p by perceiving that p, but by representing the underlying power, which
is at best a component act of the overarching act of perceiving that p. Now, if
the special way of knowing that we know p through perceiving p does not lie in
perceiving that p, but in representing a power, then it seems to me that the theory
doesn’t say much about this special way beyond making the not very helpful point
that one knows that one perceives that p through knowing that one perceives that
p.
• Finally, a remark on abilities and concepts, since that’s what we’re supposed to talk here.
What do we ascribe, I wonder, when we ascribe Rödlian powers? Do we just ascribe
abilities – the abilities involved in building spherical nests, for instance? I have a hunch
that Rödl might be inclined to say so. But if so, then what in addition to such abilities
do we ascribe in the case of self-conscious powers, i. e. when the subject has the concept,
the ‘logos’, as Rödl puts it, of the power? The likely answer is: some sort of mental
representation. I’m not sure if Rödl has to worry about this, but in any case, it raises
the question: How do self-conscious powers fit in with an ability theory of concepts?
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